This article develops a vertical differentiation model to study the competition and environmental effects of multiplicity of eco-labels within a given market. The focus is on the informational content of multiple eco-labels and whether or not they reflect the environmental qualities the labels purport to represent. Two settings are considered. In the first setting, which represents the benchmark, we assume information is complete (consumers know the true environmental qualities of the eco-labeled goods). In the second setting, information is incomplete but consumers use price as a signal for environmental qualities. Our results show that when information is complete, introduction of a second eco-label in a market improves the environmental qualities of eco-labeled goods. When information is incomplete, introduction of a second label leads to a rise in prices and a reduction in the environmental qualities of the goods. The latter setting requires specific regulation whereby information must be revealed by a benevolent social planner.
Introduction
Eco-labels are used worldwide and contribute to changing patterns of consumption in most OECD Countries (OECD, 1997). The labels exist for a variety of products such as batteries, textile, paper, wood products, …s h e r i e s and tourism. . . Their primary goal is to solve the adverse selection problem and to give consumers the information they need to make the right choice in the market. The goal has been achieved for a large variety of eco-labels (Teisl et al., 2002 , Bjorner et al., 2002 .
A phenomenon that has emerged over the past decade is multiplicity of eco-labels in a single market and for the same category of products. In the German electricity market, for example, there are three alternative labels (Grüner Storm Label, Energie Vision, and OK Power) (Tru¤er et al., 2001 ). Wo o d products have two competing eco-labels (FSC and PEFC). Sweden has three o¢ cial competing eco-labels: the ‡o w e r Pan European eco-label, the Swedish falcon and the Nordic Swan.
Agricultural and Fo o d products are also subject to multiplicity of labels (Nilson, 2004 and ESP 5 ). Use of the labels by farmers and …r m s depends on production conditions and market competition. Fo o d scarcity and disease may induce …r m s to communicate their production methods and contents more through eco-labels (Nilson, 2004) .
The International Standardization Organization (ISO) is aware of the multiplicity of eco-labeling and distinguishes between three di¤erent types of ecolabels. Type I eco-labels are those based on a voluntary multi-criteria product life cycle assessment of environmental e¤ects with veri…cation by a third party. Type II eco-labels are based on environmental claims by producers, importers, 1 EurepGAP is a label for certifying agricultural products around the globe. The main goal of this label is to reduce detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations, optimize use of inputs, and ensure a responsible approach to worker health and safety (www.eurepgap.org). 2 Demeter is label for sustainable farming. The label aims to regenerate the earth and integrate animal agriculture with soil cultivation in the same farming area. (www.biodynamie.org) 3 EKO is a label provided by the SKAL International Foundation in the Netherlands. The foundation monitors and examines worldwide biological and organic production. 4 MK is an eco-label based on life cycle analysis. 5 ESP stands "for Recognized Regional Product". 1 and retailers. Type III eco-labels provide quantitative product information according to pre-set indices similar to consumer information on product packaging.
A potential problem associated with co-existence of several eco-labels in a single market is confusion on the part of consumers. Because asymmetric information remains unresolved, consumers are not able to distinguish between di¤erent eco-labels and their informational contents. This raises several economic questions, both at the theoretical and practical policy level.
At the theoretical level, two sets of questions need to be answered. First, what are the environmental values of the additional eco-labels? Do they improve or harm the environment? How do consumers resolve their informational dilemma when faced with di¤erent eco-labels? Second, how do the additional labels impact competition in the market? At the policy level, what are the optimal policies vis-à-vis these new voluntary labeling approaches if they do not reach their environmental goals? Is regulation needed for voluntary approaches?
The paper addresses the above questions using a theoretical model that captures the environmental and competition e¤ects of the multiplicity of ecolabels in a given industry. What we show is that eco-labels enhance environmental qualities of products under perfect information. However, when information is complete, …r m s practice "greenwashing" 6 and, as a result, multiplicity of eco-labels leads to an increase in the market price and a reduction in the environmental qualities of products.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and places the contribution of our work to that literature. Section 3 develops a general model. Section 4 presents the model with complete information (the benchmark case). Section 5 develops the model with incomplete information. After comparing the two models, we conclude in section 6.
Literature review
The literature on eco-labels has yet to address the issue of multiplicity of labels. However, several papers have developed models that border on the 6 Greenwashing means that producers sell products that seem to be more environmentally friendly than what they really are. Boulding and Kirmani (1993) have demonstrated that consumers do not perceive warranties as a credible signal of product quality. Cason and Ganghadaran (2002) have shown that greenwashing is due to passiveness of the regulation of environmental claims. However, none of the authors studied the e¤ect of greenwashing in the presence of multiple eco-labels.
issue. Here, we present them in three sets. The …r s t set of articles focused on the information value of eco-labels. Ibanez and Stenger (2000) studied the information impacts of eco-labels within a vertical di¤erentiation model in three di¤erent information situations: complete, imperfect, and partial. The aim was to determine if information on food safety is consistent with a higher level of environmental quality of agriculture. The authors showed, on the one hand, that labeling could be e¢ cient from an environmental point of view depending on the proportion of high environmental quality products in the market. On the other hand, they showed that labeling policy can decrease consumer surplus. However, since the authors did not consider the informational content of the eco-labels, consumers are assumed to always infer the attributes of labels correctly. This may not always be the case as producers can cheat and claim false values of the environmental qualities of their products through eco-labels. Bougherara, et al. (2005) studied the general impact of the consumption of two di¤erent goods on the environment when labeling schemes are introduced. The authors have shown that the net e¤ect on the environment is worse than without labeling schemes. The conceptual framework used by the authors is di¤erent from ours in several respects. First, they rely on the concept of the environmental elasticity of demand to address the issue in their paper. Second, they assume that consumer preferences are identical. Third, they do not consider the problem of asymmetric information that arises in the presence of eco-labels. Heyes and Maxwell (2004) compare the environmental implications and social welfare of the "World Environmental Organization" (WEO) labeling and the "Non-Governmental" NGO labeling. They analyze the interaction between these two approaches when WEO is subject to pressure from …r m s . They have shown that if the two approaches are not interdependent, then the presence of the NGO induces a resistance toward the WEO and may reduce social welfare. If the two approaches run in parallel then they may reduce the resistance of producers towards the WEO labeling which increases welfare. However, Heyes and Maxwell (2004) did not consider the impact of the coexistence of multiple eco-labels on the environment and on competition.
Mason (2006) considered a market under asymmetric information. He showed that social welfare can increase or decrease when an eco-labeling option is introduced. The direction of change depends upon parameter values and the decision by the …r m to choose the production technology. Our work extends Mason's line of work by introducing a second eco-label for the same product.
The second set of literature considers price as a signal of quality. Fluet and Garella (2002) used price and advertising to signal quality. They showed that when the price di¤erence is small, advertising is necessary to signal quality. However, none of the studies considered the case of signaling environmental quality through prices. In our paper, it is the presence of more than one eco-label in the market that confuses for the consumer. Hence consumers use price as a signal for environmental quality. Mahenc (2008) studied prices as signals of environmental performances for polluting products. He showed that high environmental performance can be signaled either through a high or a low price depending on the link between environmental performance and competitiveness. The author used price as a signal for environmental performance but did not consider the problem of asymmetric information or presence of more than one label for the same product.
The third set of articles studied the e¤ect of eco-labeling on competition between …r m s . Amacher et al. (2004) considered a duopoly using eco-labels within a vertical di¤erentiation model. The authors show that if …r m s have the same …x e d cost, then they will always invest in an eco-label. If one …r m is more e¢ cient than the other in investing, then the other …r m 's decision to invest or not to invest depends on unit investment cost. In this case, quality dispersion remains unchanged but generally …r m s are motivated to di¤erentiate more in order to relax price competition. The authors have also shown that eco-labeling increases the environmental qualities that are too low. However, existence of a second eco-label may impact price competition and environmental quality of the products. Firms can therefore engage in opportunistic behavior. Our paper contributes to this line of research by showing that …r m s which compete with two di¤erent eco-labels have the incentive to cheat.
Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008) showed that …r m s may lobby at the criteria de…nition stage in order to modify the competitive setting. Firms not satis…ed at the criteria stage may try to develop their own label. The consequences of such a move were not treated analytically by the authors.
O'Brien and Teisl (2004) studied environmental certi…cation and labeling for forest products. Their results show that changes in eco-labeling policies a¤ect consumer's willingness to pay. As an extension of their work, one may expect that the presence of a second eco-label may impact consumer's willingness to pay also.
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Arora and Gangopadhay (1994) developed a model of over-compliance in a two stage game. Assuming consumers can value the environmental quality of a product, the model shows that the market becomes segmented and that the …r m with the lower cost always over-complies. Our contribution to this line of work lies in considering the possibility that consumer are not able to assess the environmental quality of products.
Nilson et al. (2004) analyzed the credibility of an increased number of ecolabels in the food industry. They conclude that a great number of consumers remain uninformed due to the presence of several eco-labels. We extend this line of work by studying the willingness to cheat by producers using eco-labels. Speci…cally, we ask if the presence of several eco-labels in the industry induces producers to cheat and to produce products with lower environmental quality than is claimed through the eco-label.
The empirical work by Van Amstel et al. (2008) compares the informational content of …ve eco-labels in the food industry. Findings suggest that eco-labels fail to convey to consumers the message of the environmental impacts of products. While useful, the …n d i n g s do not have an underlying theoretical structure. In our work we o¤er that structure and, as a result, give an analytical argument for Van Amstel et al.'s empirical …n d i n g s . We also address the question of whether or not producers are motivated to cheat when eco-labels fail to convey to consumers the message of the environmental impacts of products.
The structure of the model
In this section, we introduce the main assumptions of a vertical di¤erentiation model where the environmental quality is the element of di¤erentiation. First we begin with analyzing …r m s behavior. After that, we consider consumer behavior 7 .
Firms behavior
We assume two eco-labels, two …r m s , and each …r m adopts one of them. For simplicity, we also assume that two …r m s share the market and produce the same good. Firm H o¤ers the high environmental quality good q
7 A glossary of the notation used in the model is the appendix. 8 There are two kinds of labels: endogenous and exogenous (Kirchho¤ 2000) . Endogenous labels are created by the …r m itself (labels of type II or III). In this case, there is a moral 5 We assume that the two labels L H and L L are di¤erent. For illustration, suppose that L H is a type I label (an o¢ cial label like EKO, for example), and L L is a type II label (a label, like MK, where it is developed by a group of …r m s ) . We also assume that q H > q L and that q i 2 [0; 1] where i = H; L: Denote …r m H investment cost to obtain the label L H by F (q
, where >0 · .T h e…x e d cost can be interpreted as the necessary cost to adopt the label and to maintain it 9 .
Consumer behavior
We assume consumers have weak ecological awareness in the sense that they all prefer the most environmentally friendly product if they have the choice between several "environmental qualities" sold at the same price. Thus we model this situation by using a vertical di¤erentiation model. In this model, all consumers buy one unit of the product. Consumers are identi…ed by a taste parameter for the environmental quality. The parameter is uniformly distributed over the interval 
The marhazard problem since one cannot control a …r m 's claim; …r m s greenwash by declaring that they produce a product with a certain level of quality through its eco-label when in fact providing another level of environmental quality.
Exogenous or third party labeling is created by an independent labeling authority (type I label). The authority provides the criteria for the eco-label and the …r m can use the ecolabel (eco-label Blue Angel for example) if it provides proof that its product conforms to the claim of the eco-label. Firms may lie under both types of eco-labels, but when a third party is involved, false labels are revoked. This obviously makes the exogenous label more credible for consumers than the endogenous label. 9 Following Ronnen (1991), the marginal investment cost F 1 then L is e¢ cient in investment and invests in the improvement of environmental quality. If >1 then …r m L is not e¢ cient in investment and invests weakly in environmental quality. Finally, we assume that L does not invest too much in environmental quality since it provides the low environmental quality. In order to focus on investment decisions in quality, we assume that the marginal cost of quality is constant and normalized to zero ( c H = c L = 0:) ket for the good is not entirely covered, such that consumers whose 2
buy the good of environmental quality q L ; consumers whose 2 h~ ; 1 i buy the good of environmental quality q H ; and consumers whose 2 0; p L do not buy the good. In this case, the demand functions for low and high environmental quality respectively are given by:
4 The complete information case
Assuming all consumers have perfect information about environmental qualities q L and q H ; the game is as follows. In the …r s t stage, …r m s H and L with respective eco-labels L H and L L compete in environmental qualities. In the second stage, the two …r m s compete in prices. In the third stage, consumer choose to buy or not to buy the good of environmental quality H or L.
Price choice: the equilibrium prices
Pro…ts of …r m H and L are respectively given by:
The game is solved by backward induction. We start by solving the second stage of the game in which …r m s choose their prices as a function of their preceding choice of qualities. The following equilibrium prices are obtained:
Expressions (4.3) and (4.4) imply that p HC > p LC ; where
The expressions also imply that the low quality …r m …x e s a price that is below half the price charged by the high quality …r m . Note that the closer q L is to q H , the closer the solution to Bertrand, i.e., prices are equal to marginal costs.
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The demand functions at the equilibrium prices of the complete information case are:
These functions imply that quantity sold by …r m L is equal to half the quantity sold by …r m H.
Equilibrium pro…ts are given by:
denote revenues of the high and the low environmental quality …r m s , respectively.
Di¤erentiation of R HC with respect to q L and R LC with respect to q H yields:
The derivative in (4.9) implies that a reduction in q L increases revenues of …r m H. The derivative in (4.10) implies that an increase in q H increases revenues of …r m L.
The results mean that the more di¤erentiated the products are in term of environmental qualities, the more relaxed the competition in prices, and the more the …r m s increase their revenues. The same result was found by Amacher et al. (2004) . We conclude that despite the presence of two eco-labels in the market, …r m s will push the di¤erentiation between their environmental qualities to a maximum. The presence of a second eco-label improves the whole environmental performance of the sector. From this point view, …r m H might as well abandon its eco-label and choose the minimum environmental quality. This has also been suggested also by Ben Youssef and Lahmandi-Ayed (2008). 
Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in quality
In the …r s t stage of the game …r m s compete simultaneously in quality. Each …r m …x e s its quality taking the quality of the other …r m as given. Pro…ts of …r m H and L are given respectively by (4.7) and (4.8), which we re-write as:
A Nash equilibrium in environmental qualities must satisfy the following …r s t order conditions:
which imply that the optimal qualities are obtained by equalizing marginal cost of investment in environmental quality and marginal revenue.
The 
The slopes of the reaction functions in quality space are given by:
The reaction functions have positive slopes, which implies that the products are strategic complements. Indeed, since an increase in q L reduces the di¤erence q H q L and intensi…es price competition, …r m H has an incentive to increase its environmental quality in order to relax price competition. So, in the complete information case, …r m L must invest in environmental quality. Since >1; the more tends to 1; the more e¢ cient is …r m L, the higher the quality q L and consequently the more …r m H will invest in quality in order to increase its quality and, hence, relax price competition.
PROPOSITION 1:
In the complete information case, the introduction of a second eco-label in the market increases the environmental quality of the products produced by the two …r m s and subsequently the global environmental quality 10 We conclude that when there are several eco-labels in the market, and if …r m s o¤er the product with the true environmental quality claimed in each eco-label, then the global environmental quality will be raised.
The next section develops the case with incomplete information. Consumers are assumed to know that there are two eco-labels in the market but don't know which …r m produces the high environmental quality good and which one o¤ers the low environmental quality good.
The incomplete information case

De…nition, the model, and assumptions
By incomplete information or asymmetric information, we mean a situation where consumers cannot observe the true environmental qualities of the goods purported by the eco-labels. When consumers face several eco-labels, they are unable to associate an environmental quality to a special eco-label. Information cost is assumed prohibitive. There are no reputation e¤ects and presence of two or more di¤erent eco-labels in the market leads consumers to question the value of the ecological information of the labels.
Each producer claims o¤ering a high environmental quality good through its own eco-label but consumers do not know who is telling the truth? The question then is what type of eco-label conveys the higher environmental value, given that the cost of verifying the environmental performance of the …r m is prohibitive for consumers. In the food industry, for example, the eco-labels' criteria are di¤erent depending on which label it is. Some labels focus on presence of pesticide residue, others on additives and preservatives but they all claim to be environmentally friendly. How are consumers to know that …r m s are not greenwashing (Van Amstel et al., 2008, Kirchho¤, 2000) ?
Speci…cally, consumers have no information on the environmental qualities of the eco-labels L L and L H : Their basic belief is that the two eco-labels are di¤erent and that one is more performing than the other. , then consumers assign a …f t y percent chance that …r m H or L has a high environmental quality. If p H ; p L = 0; then consumers are sure that the …r m which charges p H is a low environmental quality producer. Letting ( ) = q H + (1 )q L represent the quality that consumers expect to obtain on average, then
If the price vector doesn't convey any information about environmental quality, demand will always be the same for each …r m and is equal to:
The game then proceeds as follows. In the …r s t stage, …r m s H and L with eco-labels L H and L L compete in the provision of goods with environmental 11 qualities. In the second stage, the two …r m s compete in prices. In the third stage, consumers observe prices, update their beliefs and decide whether or not to buy good with environmental quality H or L.
Sequential
Conditions (1) and (2) imply that each …r m will choose a price that maximizes its pro…ts taking as given the strategy of the other …r m and the belief of the consumers. Conditions (3), (4), and (5) imply that beliefs must be compatible with the structure of the game and with the strategies of the …r m s (consistency). If …r m s choose di¤erent strategies then consumers will be able to know exactly which …r m is a high or a low environmental quality …r m . In contrast, if …r m s choose the same strategy, consumers will then revert to their prior beliefs that either …r m is the high quality …r m .
Firms'incentives
Assuming that …r m s ' s t r a t e g i e s are to set prices equal to the complete information prices p HC ; p LC ; then their respective pro…ts will be equal to HC ; LC : If on the other hand we assume that …r m 's L strategy is to replicate …r m 's H strategy and then set price p 
In the incomplete information case, the low environmental quality …r m has an incentive to replicate the strategy of the high environmental quality …r m .
This proposition implies that if the low environmental quality …r m replicates the high environmental quality …r m 's strategy then its pro…t will be higher than in the complete information case. Now, if the high environmental quality …r m replicates the low environmental quality …r m 's strategy and sets price p 
) aq This proposition implies that if the high environmental quality …r m replicates the low environmental quality …r m 's strategy, then its pro…ts will be lower than in the complete information case.
Propositions 2 and 3 demonstrate that the low environmental quality …r m always has the incentive to mimic the full information price of the high environmental quality …r m irrespective with the quality di¤erence between the …r m s . In contrast, the high environmental quality …r m will never mimic the full information price of the low quality …r m . This result implies that the full information prices can never be a separating equilibrium in the incomplete information case.
Characterization of a separating equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium each …r m will choose di¤erent pricesp
It is an equilibrium where consumers infer correctly environmental quality levels:
De…nition of a separating equilibrium
The price vector p L ;p H wherep L <p H is a separating equilibrium if:
Condition (1) implies that given the separation of …r m s , the low environmental quality …r m chooses its price to maximize its pro…ts. Condition (2) implies that if …r m L choosesp L its pro…ts will be higher than it chooses to mimic the high environmental pricep H : Condition (3) implies that …r m H prefers choosingp H than mimicking …r m L and choosingp L : Conditions (2) and (3) represent incentive constraints. We can deduce from (2) and (3) that the strategies vector p LC ; p HC can never be a separating equilibrium.
In the next section, we de…ne the di¤erent prices possible in a separating equilibrium 11 .
Characterization of a separating equilibrium
This proposition implies that any deviation from the equilibrium prices confuses consumers, i.e., they will not know which …r m is o¤ering which quality. A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium where the …r m o¤ering the high environmental quality conveys a signal that the low environmental quality …r m cannot mimic otherwise the equilibrium is pooling (Spence, 1973) .
From (5.5) we conclude that there is an interval for the existence ofp H : From (5.4) and (5.5) we conclude that if we take ap H from (5.5), it will correspond to a uniquep L :
To …n d the interval, letp
be the smallest possible value forp H : What we want to calculate isp 
Quality competition and …r m s ' i n c e nt i ve s
In this section, we are interested in environmental quality choice of the third stage of the game. Recall that the third stage of the game involves simultaneous quality competition 12 . Of particular interest is comparison of the environmental qualities with complete and with incomplete information.
Comparison of the revenues of the complete and incomplete information cases
In the incomplete information case, the respective pro…ts of …r m H and L are:
In the complete information case, the respective pro…ts of …r m s H and L pro…ts are respectively:
Revenues of …r m H under incomplete and complete information case are respectively:
)p H and 12 The existence, concavity and stability conditions have been studied in the complete information case and results are exactly the same.
Revenues of …r m L under incomplete and complete information case are respectively:
Proposition 7 implies that in the incomplete information case, …r m s ' r e venues are always higher than those obtained in the complete information case. This situation can be explained with proposition 5. Proposition 5 establishes that the asymmetric information prices are always higher than the complete information prices. Therefore the revenues of the two …r m s in the asymmetric information case are higher than in the complete information case. Secondly, we showed in proposition 6 that a separating equilibrium exists if the quality di¤erence is su¢ ciently high and, in this case, the market is well segmented and price competition is relaxed, and revenue are higher.
Quality choice and …r m s ' i n c e nt i ve s PROPOSITION 8: Denote byq
L andq H the environmental qualities of …r m H and L in the incomplete information case. In the asymmetric information case, each …r m has the incentive to choose an environmental quality level that is lower or equal to their complete information environmental quality. That means q HC ^q L : q H and q LC T his proposition establishes that even if products have eco-labels, their environmental qualities can be very low and do not match the environmental quality expected from the eco-label. This occurs because the multiplicity of eco-labels permits …r m s to practice "greenwashing". Second, the proposition says that the global level of environmental quality decreases since q HC q H 17 q L : So eco-labels do not re ‡ect the true level of environmental and q LC q ualities when several eco-labels are present in the market. Therefore, the consumer will buy a labeled product with a higher price but a lower environmental quality. Despite the fact that an eco-label is a means to reduce the informational gap between producers and consumers, consumers will not use the eco-label information to buy the product.
Conclusion
The article develops a model which explains how the presence of several ecolabels in the same market a¤ects both the information value of the labels and their environmental qualities. The model assumes two …r m s and two labels. One …r m supplies a high environmental quality product and the other a low environmental quality product. Two settings are considered: one with complete information, where consumers know perfectly which …r m o¤ers the high or the low environmental quality product; the other with incomplete information, where consumers do not know which …r m o¤ers which product with which environmental quality.
The paper arrives at two results. In the case of complete information, introduction of a second eco-label in a market improves the environmental qualities of the products supplied by …r m s . If …r m s do not practice opportunistic behavior, i.e., if each …r m o¤ers its product with the environmental quality announced in the eco-label, then the presence of several eco-labels will increase global environmental quality.
In the case of incomplete information, presence of a second eco-label decreases the global environmental quality level of both …r m s . This result is paradoxical since eco-labels are supposed to convey a message of high environmental quality. When there is multiplicity of eco-labels, the incentive of each …r m is to diminish their respective environmental qualities, and the consumer will not take into account the label in her decision to buy the product.
The implication for policy is that improvement of information related to the environmental quality of products becomes a principal instrument of environmental policy in the presence of multiplicity of labels. c i : marginal cost of producing a good with quality i.
: quality taste parameter.
U(q i ; p i ; ) : utility of a consumer of type .
: marginal consumer who is indi¤erent between high or low environmental quality. 
